That is why the EU-Turkey agreement is much more than a burden shift. It is the cornerstone of an international solution to a transnational problem. Many NGOs and academics may seek to optimise the protection of refugees in the countries where they are rooted, but the aim of the Geneva Convention ultimately cannot be achieved by a few countries alone – especially considering that the alternative to an EU-Turkey agreement could be the closure of borders across Europe and the collapse of the CEAS. This is not to say that the forthcoming agreement should not be carefully examined, both politically and legally. But the underlying idea deserves to be applauded – as the UNHCR Executive Committee indirectly acknowledged almost thirty years ago: it should also be stressed that, in areas where the Union has already exercised its competence, Member States are not only excluded from the conclusion of international agreements, since the wording of Article 3, Paragraph 2 TFEU provides that they are excluded from action, which could lead to the adoption of acts having legal effects. In the case of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), for example, Greece has failed to fulfil its treaty obligations by merely submitting a proposal to the IMO`s Maritime Safety Committee, as this could lead to legally binding rules over time. This case provides a good analogy for the EU-Turkey agreement. For those who think the declaration is not problematic because it is not legally binding, it is easy to cite the laws Greece adopted in the weeks following its publication to ensure the effective implementation of the agreement. In summary, I consider that, irrespective of the legal nature and direct effects of the Declaration, the Member States did not have competence or authority to act solely with regard to the return of irregular migrants to Turkey. For assistance or more information on the local strategy, please contact: Delegation-turkey-hr-defenders@eeas.europa.eu The second surprising element of the decision is the reaction of the institutions when the Court asked them to produce relevant documents to determine who carried out the transaction and whether the September 18 meeting was not the case.

March 2016. The European Council, the Council of the EU (the Council) and the Commission have all denied any involvement in the process that led to the agreement, while there was ample evidence to the contrary in the media, stating that the declaration “is not intended to have legally binding effects or to constitute an agreement or treaty” (NF, para. 27). It was simply a “political agreement” (NF, para. 29). In areas of shared competence, Member States may exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised or has not exercised its competence (Article 2(2) TFEU). As regards Turkey`s readmission of third-country nationals (TCN), this is clear and exactly what the EU-Turkey regulator covers. In other words, the Union exercised its competence in this particular area and anticipated the competence of the Member States to conclude an agreement with Turkey on this matter. Even if Article 79(3) TFEU did not exist and the European Union did not have explicit external competence, the existing EU-Turkey Royal Decree would still confer on the European Union implied exclusive competence under the AETRA doctrine, now codified in Article 3(2) TFEU, on the basis of the existing EU-Turkey Royal Decree on the basis of the return agreement for irregular migrants `affect the common rules or amend their scope. may”.

See, for example, the definition of safe third country in Article 38(1)(e) of the Directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. A concrete example of an amendment implementing one of the commitments under the agreement (the `One-for-One` commitment) is set out in Decision 2016/1754, which amended the second relocation decision in favour of Greece and Italy in order to allow the relocation of Syrian nationals residing in Turkey under the existing regime. Without a credible chance of Turkey`s accession to the EU in the foreseeable future, accession offers no hope of democratic conditionality. Instead, the EU should at least start talking about the prospect of a revised association agreement with Turkey to get relations back on track. Turkey may eventually be ready to return to the path of democracy. The EU should reflect on what it will offer Turkey when the time comes. Second, many would expect Turkey to simply reject democratic elements in any new deal. This may be the case with the current government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoea. However, it is important to point out that association agreements last longer than governments: in the case of Turkey, the agreement used today dates back to 1963.

The most vulnerable – including unaccompanied children, families with children, people who identify as LGBTQI, with health problems, survivors of gender-based violence and victims of torture – must be prioritized until a more sustainable, equitable and sustainable relocation mechanism is put in place. The crackdown that followed President Erdoğan`s coup attempt in Turkey in 2016 has damaged relations with the EU. Erdoğan signaled his agreement to the reintroduction of the death penalty to punish those involved in the coup, with the EU suggesting it would end his European ambitions. Erdoğan said in November 2016 that he planned to submit Turkey`s continued accession negotiations with the EU to a referendum in 2017. [49] In November 2016, the European Parliament voted in favour of a non-binding resolution calling on the European Commission to temporarily suspend accession negotiations due to the “disproportionate repressive measures” taken by the government against the coup. [50] On 13th December the European Council (composed of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States) decided that, in the “present circumstances”, it would not open new areas in Turkey`s accession negotiations; [51] Turkey`s path to autocratic rule makes progress towards EU membership impossible. [52] Totally incompatible Initial phase Considerable effort is required Additional efforts are needed Moderately advanced Good level of preparedness well advanced. More information on the Customs Union and preferential arrangements In 2006, the European Parliament voted against a proposal to formally include the issue as a candidate for Turkey`s accession. [151] A similar proposal by Greek Cypriot and Greek Cypriot MPs was also rejected by the European Parliament in 2011. [152] First, the systemic structure of the Directive distinguishes between “super-safe” third countries (Article 39) and countries that are only “safe” (Article 38). In the first case, full ratification without geographical restriction is explicitly required (Article 39(2)(a)), while safe third countries only provide protection “in accordance” (French: conformity; German: in accordance with) the Geneva Convention on Refugees (Article 38(1)(e)).

Turkey can only be considered a safe third country under Article 38 which, unlike Article 39, requires an individual examination of an asylum application before it is refused. The third caveat is that the ongoing sovereignty disputes over Cyprus between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey could affect the functioning of Ankara`s Association Agreement with the EU. The island remains divided and there are no direct trade relations, air travel or maritime links between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. This impasse has complicated negotiations with Turkey, as the Republic of Cyprus has raised objections to certain aspects of the EU-Turkey talks at various times. For example, while tensions between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean increased in 2019, the Council of the EU decided not to hold EU-Turkey Association Council meetings for the time being, suspending a direct channel for dialogue. At its meeting in June 2021, the European Council reaffirmed the EU`s commitment to cooperate with Turkey in a progressive, proportionate and reversible manner in order to strengthen cooperation in a number of areas of common interest. It also called on the Commission to present without delay formal proposals to continue funding Syrian refugees and host communities in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and other parts of the region.